HCRX_EL2

Provides configuration controls for virtualization, including defining whether various operations are trapped to EL2.

Configuration

This register is present only when FEAT_HCX is implemented. Otherwise, direct accesses to HCRX_EL2 are UNDEFINED.

Attributes

Field descriptions

Bits [63:25]

PACMEn, bit [24]
When FEAT_PAuth_LR is implemented:

PACM Enable. Controls the effect of a PACM instruction at EL1 and EL0.

PACMEn	Meaning
0b0	The effects of PACM are disabled at EL1 and EL0, regardless of the value in any other controls.
0b1	This control does not disable the effect of PACM at EL1 and EL0.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnFPM, bit [23]
When FEAT_FPMR is implemented:

Enables the following accesses to FPMR from EL0 and EL1 to EL2:

Direct accesses reported with EC syndrome value 0x18.
Indirect reads as a result of execution of an FP8 instruction reported with EC syndrome value 0x00.

EnFPM	Meaning
0b0	EL1 and EL0 accesses to FPMR are disabled and trapped to EL2.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

Traps are not taken if there is a higher priority exception generated by the access.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

GCSEn, bit [22]
When FEAT_GCS is implemented:

Guarded Control Stack enable. Controls Guarded Control Stack behavior at EL1 and EL0.

GCSEn	Meaning
0b0	The Guarded Control Stack is disabled at EL1 and EL0.
0b1	Guarded Control Stack behavior at EL1 and EL0 is not affected by mechanism.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnIDCP128, bit [21]
When FEAT_SYSREG128 is implemented:

Enables access to IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED 128-bit System registers.

EnIDCP128	Meaning
0b0	Accesses at EL1, EL0 to IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED 128-bit System registers are trapped to EL2 using an ESR_EL2.EC value of 0x14, unless the access generates a higher priority exception. Disables the functionality of the 128-bit IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED System registers that are accessible at EL2.
0b1	No accesses are trapped by this control.

EnIDCP128

Meaning

0b0

Accesses at EL1, EL0 to IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED 128-bit System registers are trapped to EL2 using an ESR_EL2.EC value of 0x14, unless the access generates a higher priority exception.

Disables the functionality of the 128-bit IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED System registers that are accessible at EL2.

0b1

No accesses are trapped by this control.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnSDERR, bit [20]
When FEAT_ADERR is implemented:

Enable Synchronous Device Read Error. Override SCTLR2_EL1.EnADERR.

EnSDERR	Meaning
0b0	This field has no effect on External aborts on Device memory reads in the EL1&0 translation regime.
0b1	External abort on Device memory reads generate synchronous Data Abort exceptions in the EL1&0 translation regime.

It is implementation-specific whether this field applies to memory reads generated by each of the following:

SIMD&FP register loads.
When FEAT_SVE is implemented, SVE register loads.
When FEAT_SME is implemented, SME register loads.
When FEAT_LSE is implemented, LD<op>, SWP and CAS{P} Atomic instructions that return a value to the PE.
When FEAT_LS64_V is implemented, LD64B and ST64BV{0} instructions that return a value to the PE.
When FEAT_THE is implemented, RCW instructions that return a value to the PE.

Setting this field to 1 does not guarantee that the PE is able to take a synchronous Data Abort exception for an External abort on a Device memory read in every case. There might be implementation-specific circumstances when an error on a load cannot be taken synchronously. These circumstances should be rare enough that treating such occurrences as fatal does not cause a significant increase in failure rate.

If FEAT_SVE is implemented, HCRX_EL2.EnSDERR is 1, and the access generating the External abort is due to any Active element of an SVE Non-fault vector load instruction or an Active element that is not the first Active element of an SVE First-fault vector load instruction, then no exception is generated and the External abort is reported in the FFR.

Setting this field to 1 might have a performance impact for Device memory reads.

This field is ignored by the PE and has an Effective value of 0 when any of the following are true:

All of the following are true:
- FEAT_ANERR is implemented.
- ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.ADERR reads as 0b0010.
- HCRX_EL2.{EnSDERR, EnSNERR} == {1, 0}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.
EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

TMEA, bit [19]
When FEAT_DoubleFault2 is implemented:

Trap Masked External Aborts. Controls whether a masked error exception at a lower Exception level is taken to EL2.

TMEA	Meaning
0b0	Synchronous External abort exceptions, physical SError exceptions, and delegated SError exceptions at EL1 and EL0 are unaffected by this mechanism. That is, these exceptions are not taken to EL2 unless routed to EL2 by another control. Virtual SError exceptions are not enabled by this mechanism.
0b1	When executing at Exception levels below EL2, if EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, then all of the following apply: When PSTATE.A is 1, synchronous External abort exceptions are taken to EL2, unless they are routed to EL3. Masked physical SError exceptions are taken to EL2, unless they are routed to EL3. If FEAT_E3DSE is implemented, then masked delegated SError exceptions enabled by SCR_EL3.DSE are taken to EL2. If HCR_EL2.TGE is 0, then virtual SError exceptions are enabled.

TMEA

Meaning

0b0

Synchronous External abort exceptions, physical SError exceptions, and delegated SError exceptions at EL1 and EL0 are unaffected by this mechanism. That is, these exceptions are not taken to EL2 unless routed to EL2 by another control.

Virtual SError exceptions are not enabled by this mechanism.

0b1

When executing at Exception levels below EL2, if EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, then all of the following apply:

When PSTATE.A is 1, synchronous External abort exceptions are taken to EL2, unless they are routed to EL3.
Masked physical SError exceptions are taken to EL2, unless they are routed to EL3.
If FEAT_E3DSE is implemented, then masked delegated SError exceptions enabled by SCR_EL3.DSE are taken to EL2.
If HCR_EL2.TGE is 0, then virtual SError exceptions are enabled.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.
EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.

Virtual SError exceptions are disabled when the Effective value of HCR_EL2.AMO is 0 and the Effective value of HCRX_EL2.TMEA is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnSNERR, bit [18]
When FEAT_ANERR is implemented:

Enable Synchronous Normal Read Error. Override SCTLR2_EL1.EnANERR.

EnSNERR	Meaning
0b0	This field has no effect on External aborts on Normal memory reads in the EL1&0 translation regime.
0b1	External abort on Normal memory reads generate synchronous Data Abort exceptions in the EL1&0 translation regime.

It is implementation-specific whether this field applies to memory reads generated by each of the following:

When FEAT_SME is implemented:
- SVE register loads when the PE is in Streaming SVE mode.
- SME register loads.
When FEAT_LSE is implemented, LD<op>, SWP and CAS{P} Atomic instructions that return a value to the PE.
When FEAT_LS64_V is implemented, LD64B and ST64BV{0} instructions that return a value to the PE.
When FEAT_THE is implemented, RCW instructions that return a value to the PE.

Setting this field to 1 does not guarantee that the PE is able to take a synchronous Data Abort exception for an External abort on a Normal memory read in every case. There might be implementation-specific circumstances when an error on a load cannot be taken synchronously. These circumstances should be rare enough that treating such occurrences as fatal does not cause a significant increase in failure rate.

If FEAT_SVE is implemented, HCRX_EL2.EnSNERR is 1, and the access generating the External abort is due to any Active element of an SVE Non-fault vector load instruction or an Active element that is not the first Active element of an SVE First-fault vector load instruction, then no exception is generated and the External abort is reported in the FFR.

Setting this field to 1 might have a performance impact for Normal memory reads.

This field is ignored by the PE and has an Effective value of 0 when any of the following are true:

All of the following are true:
- FEAT_ADERR is implemented.
- ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.ANERR reads as 0b0010.
- HCRX_EL2.{EnSDERR, EnSNERR} == {0, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.
EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

D128En, bit [17]
When FEAT_D128 is implemented:

128-bit System Register trap control. Enable access to 128-bit System Registers that relate to VMSAv9-128 via MRRS, MSRR instructions.

If EL1 is using AArch64 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x14:

TTBR0_EL1.
TTBR1_EL1.
If FEAT_THE is implemented, RCWMASK_EL1, RCWSMASK_EL1.
PAR_EL1.

D128En	Meaning
0b0	EL1 accesses to the specified registers are disabled, and trapped to EL2.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

When EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state, the Effective value of this field is 1.

Otherwise, when the Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0, the Effective value of this field is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

PTTWI, bit [16]
When FEAT_THE is implemented:

Permit Translation Table Walk Incoherence.

Permits RCWS instructions to generate writes that have the Reduced Coherence property.

PTTWI	Meaning
0b0	Write accesses generated by RCWS at EL1 and EL0 do not have the Reduced Coherence property.
0b1	Write accesses generated by RCWS at EL1 and EL0 have the Reduced Coherence property, if enabled by TCR2_EL1.PTTWI.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

This field is permitted to be cached in TLB.

This field is permitted to be implemented as a read-only field with a fixed value of 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

SCTLR2En, bit [15]
When FEAT_SCTLR2 is implemented:

SCTLR2_EL1 Enable. In AArch64 state, accesses to SCTLR2_EL1 are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.

SCTLR2En	Meaning
0b0	Accesses to SCTLR2_EL1 at EL1 are trapped to EL2, unless the access generates a higher priority exception. The value in SCTLR2_EL1 is treated as 0.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

When EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state, the Effective value of this field is 1.

Otherwise, when the Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0, the Effective value of this field is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

TCR2En, bit [14]
When FEAT_TCR2 is implemented:

TCR2_EL1 Enable. In AArch64 state, accesses to TCR2_EL1 are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.

TCR2En	Meaning
0b0	Accesses to TCR2_EL1 at EL1 are trapped to EL2, unless the access generates a higher priority exception. The value in TCR2_EL1 is treated as 0.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

When EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state, the Effective value of this field is 1.

Otherwise, when the Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0, the Effective value of this field is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

Bits [13:12]

MSCEn, bit [11]
When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

Memory Set and Memory Copy instructions Enable. Enables execution of the CPY*, SETG*, SETP*, SETM*, and SETE* instructions at EL1 or EL0.

MSCEn	Meaning
0b0	Execution of the Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions is UNDEFINED at EL1 or EL0.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be UNDEFINED.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

MCE2, bit [10]
When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

Controls Memory Copy and Memory Set exceptions generated as part of attempting to execute the Memory Copy and Memory Set instructions from EL1.

MCE2	Meaning
0b0	Memory Copy and Memory Set exceptions generated from EL1 are taken to EL1.
0b1	Memory Copy and Memory Set exceptions generated from EL1 are taken to EL2.

When the Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this control does not affect any exceptions due to the higher priority SCTLR_EL2.MSCEn control.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

CMOW, bit [9]
When FEAT_CMOW is implemented:

Controls cache maintenance instruction permission for the following instructions executed at EL1 or EL0.

IC IVAU, DC CIVAC, DC CIGDVAC and DC CIGVAC.
ICIMVAU, DCCIMVAC.

CMOW	Meaning
0b0	These instructions executed at EL1 or EL0 with stage 2 read permission, but without stage 2 write permission do not generate a stage 2 permission fault.
0b1	These instructions executed at EL1 or EL0, if enabled as a result of SCTLR_EL1.UCI==1, with stage 2 read permission, but without stage 2 write permission generate a stage 2 permission fault.

For this control, stage 2 has write permission if S2AP[1] is 1 or DBM is 1 in the stage 2 descriptor. The instructions do not cause an update to the dirty state.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.
EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.

This field is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

VFNMI, bit [8]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Virtual FIQ Interrupt with Superpriority. Enables signaling of virtual FIQ interrupts with Superpriority.

VFNMI	Meaning
0b0	When HCR_EL2.VF is 1, a signaled pending virtual FIQ interrupt does not have Superpriority.
0b1	When HCR_EL2.VF is 1, a signaled pending virtual FIQ interrupt has Superpriority.

When HCR_EL2.VF is 0, this field has no effect.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

VINMI, bit [7]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Virtual IRQ Interrupt with Superpriority. Enables signaling of virtual IRQ interrupts with Superpriority.

VINMI	Meaning
0b0	When HCR_EL2.VI is 1, a signaled pending virtual IRQ interrupt does not have Superpriority.
0b1	When HCR_EL2.VI is 1, a signaled pending virtual IRQ interrupt has Superpriority.

When HCR_EL2.VI is 0, this field has no effect.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

TALLINT, bit [6]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Traps the following writes at EL1 using AArch64 to EL2, when EL2 is implemented and enabled:

MSR (register) writes of ALLINT.
MSR (immediate) writes of ALLINT with a value of 1.

TALLINT	Meaning
0b0	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.
0b1	The specified MSR accesses at EL1 using AArch64 are trapped to EL2.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

SMPME, bit [5]
When FEAT_SME is implemented:

Streaming Mode Priority Mapping Enable.

Controls mapping of the value of SMPRI_EL1.Priority for streaming execution priority at EL0 or EL1.

SMPME	Meaning
0b0	The effective priority value is taken from SMPRI_EL1.Priority.
0b1	The effective priority value is: When the current Exception level is EL2 or EL3, the value of SMPRI_EL1.Priority. When the current Exception level is EL0 or EL1, the value of the SMPRIMAP_EL2 field corresponding to the value of SMPRI_EL1.Priority.

SMPME

Meaning

0b0

The effective priority value is taken from SMPRI_EL1.Priority.

0b1

The effective priority value is:

When the current Exception level is EL2 or EL3, the value of SMPRI_EL1.Priority.
When the current Exception level is EL0 or EL1, the value of the SMPRIMAP_EL2 field corresponding to the value of SMPRI_EL1.Priority.

When SMIDR_EL1.SMPS is '0', this field is RES0.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.
EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

FGTnXS, bit [4]
When FEAT_XS is implemented:

Determines if the fine-grained traps in HFGITR_EL2 that apply to each of the TLBI maintenance instructions that are accessible at EL1 also apply to the corresponding TLBI maintenance instructions with the nXS qualifier.

FGTnXS	Meaning
0b0	The fine-grained trap in the HFGITR_EL2 that applies to a TLBI maintenance instruction at EL1 also applies to the corresponding TLBI instruction with the nXS qualifier at EL1.
0b1	The fine-grained trap in the HFGITR_EL2 that applies to a TLBI maintenance instruction at EL1 does not apply to the corresponding TLBI instruction with the nXS qualifier at EL1.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

FnXS, bit [3]
When FEAT_XS is implemented:

Determines the behavior of TLBI instructions affected by the XS attribute.

This control field also determines whether an AArch64 DSB instruction behaves as a DSB instruction with an nXS qualifier when executed at EL0 and EL1.

FnXS	Meaning
0b0	This control does not have any effect on the behavior of the TLBI maintenance instructions.
0b1	A TLBI maintenance instruction without the nXS qualifier executed at EL1 behaves in the same way as the corresponding TLBI maintenance instruction with the nXS qualifier. An AArch64 DSB instruction executed at EL1 or EL0 behaves in the same way as the corresponding DSB instruction with the nXS qualifier executed at EL1 or EL0.

FnXS

Meaning

0b0

This control does not have any effect on the behavior of the TLBI maintenance instructions.

0b1

A TLBI maintenance instruction without the nXS qualifier executed at EL1 behaves in the same way as the corresponding TLBI maintenance instruction with the nXS qualifier.

An AArch64 DSB instruction executed at EL1 or EL0 behaves in the same way as the corresponding DSB instruction with the nXS qualifier executed at EL1 or EL0.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

This field is permitted to be cached in a TLB.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnASR, bit [2]
When FEAT_LS64_V is implemented:

When the Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}, traps execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL0 or EL1 to EL2.

EnASR	Meaning
0b0	Execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnASR. Execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

EnASR

Meaning

0b0

Execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnASR.

Execution of an ST64BV instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.

0b1

This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

A trap of an ST64BV instruction is reported using an ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x0A, with an ISS code of 0x0000000.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnALS, bit [1]
When FEAT_LS64 is implemented:

When the Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}, traps execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL0 or EL1 to EL2.

EnALS	Meaning
0b0	Execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnALS. Execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

EnALS

Meaning

0b0

Execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnALS.

Execution of an LD64B or ST64B instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.

0b1

This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

A trap of an LD64B or ST64B instruction is reported using an ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x0A, with an ISS code of 0x0000002.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

EnAS0, bit [0]
When FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA is implemented:

When the Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}, traps execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL0 or EL1 to EL2.

EnAS0	Meaning
0b0	Execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnAS0. Execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.
0b1	This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

EnAS0

Meaning

0b0

Execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL0 is trapped to EL2 if the execution is not trapped by SCTLR_EL1.EnAS0.

Execution of an ST64BV0 instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2.

0b1

This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped.

A trap of an ST64BV0 instruction is reported using an ESR_ELx.EC value of 0x0A, with an ISS code of 0x0000001.

The Effective value of this field is 1 when any of the following are true:

EL2 is not implemented or not enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}.

The Effective value of this field is 0 when all of the following are true:

EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state.
The Effective value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is not {1, 1}.
The Effective value of SCR_EL3.HXEn is 0.

The reset behavior of this field is:

On a Warm reset:
- When the highest implemented Exception level is EL2, this field resets to 0.
- Otherwise, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.

Otherwise:

Accessing HCRX_EL2

Accesses to this register use the following encodings in the System register encoding space:

MRS <Xt>, HCRX_EL2

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b100	0b0001	0b0010	0b010

if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then if EffectiveHCR_EL2_NVx() IN {'1x1'} then X[t, 64] = NVMem[0xA0]; elsif EffectiveHCR_EL2_NVx() IN {'xx1'} then AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18); else UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then if HaveEL(EL3) && EL3SDDUndefPriority() && SCR_EL3.HXEn == '0' then UNDEFINED; elsif HaveEL(EL3) && SCR_EL3.HXEn == '0' then if EL3SDDUndef() then UNDEFINED; else AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18); else X[t, 64] = HCRX_EL2; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then X[t, 64] = HCRX_EL2;

MSR HCRX_EL2, <Xt>

op0	op1	CRn	CRm	op2
0b11	0b100	0b0001	0b0010	0b010

if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then if EffectiveHCR_EL2_NVx() IN {'1x1'} then NVMem[0xA0] = X[t, 64]; elsif EffectiveHCR_EL2_NVx() IN {'xx1'} then AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18); else UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then if HaveEL(EL3) && EL3SDDUndefPriority() && SCR_EL3.HXEn == '0' then UNDEFINED; elsif HaveEL(EL3) && SCR_EL3.HXEn == '0' then if EL3SDDUndef() then UNDEFINED; else AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL3, 0x18); else HCRX_EL2 = X[t, 64]; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then HCRX_EL2 = X[t, 64];

63	62	61	60	59	58	57	56	55	54	53	52	51	50	49	48	47	46	45	44	43	42	41	40	39	38	37	36	35	34	33	32
31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
RES0
RES0							PACMEn	EnFPM	GCSEn	EnIDCP128	EnSDERR	TMEA	EnSNERR	D128En	PTTWI	SCTLR2En	TCR2En	RES0		MSCEn	MCE2	CMOW	VFNMI	VINMI	TALLINT	SMPME	FGTnXS	FnXS	EnASR	EnALS	EnAS0

HCRX_EL2, Extended Hypervisor Configuration Register

Purpose

Configuration

Attributes

Field descriptions

Bits [63:25]

PACMEn, bit [24]When FEAT_PAuth_LR is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnFPM, bit [23]When FEAT_FPMR is implemented:

Otherwise:

GCSEn, bit [22]When FEAT_GCS is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnIDCP128, bit [21]When FEAT_SYSREG128 is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnSDERR, bit [20]When FEAT_ADERR is implemented:

Otherwise:

TMEA, bit [19]When FEAT_DoubleFault2 is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnSNERR, bit [18]When FEAT_ANERR is implemented:

Otherwise:

D128En, bit [17]When FEAT_D128 is implemented:

Otherwise:

PTTWI, bit [16]When FEAT_THE is implemented:

Otherwise:

SCTLR2En, bit [15]When FEAT_SCTLR2 is implemented:

Otherwise:

TCR2En, bit [14]When FEAT_TCR2 is implemented:

Otherwise:

Bits [13:12]

MSCEn, bit [11]When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

Otherwise:

MCE2, bit [10]When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

Otherwise:

CMOW, bit [9]When FEAT_CMOW is implemented:

Otherwise:

VFNMI, bit [8]When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Otherwise:

VINMI, bit [7]When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Otherwise:

TALLINT, bit [6]When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

Otherwise:

SMPME, bit [5]When FEAT_SME is implemented:

Otherwise:

FGTnXS, bit [4]When FEAT_XS is implemented:

Otherwise:

FnXS, bit [3]When FEAT_XS is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnASR, bit [2]When FEAT_LS64_V is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnALS, bit [1]When FEAT_LS64 is implemented:

Otherwise:

EnAS0, bit [0]When FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA is implemented:

Otherwise:

Accessing HCRX_EL2

MRS <Xt>, HCRX_EL2

MSR HCRX_EL2, <Xt>

PACMEn, bit [24]
When FEAT_PAuth_LR is implemented:

EnFPM, bit [23]
When FEAT_FPMR is implemented:

GCSEn, bit [22]
When FEAT_GCS is implemented:

EnIDCP128, bit [21]
When FEAT_SYSREG128 is implemented:

EnSDERR, bit [20]
When FEAT_ADERR is implemented:

TMEA, bit [19]
When FEAT_DoubleFault2 is implemented:

EnSNERR, bit [18]
When FEAT_ANERR is implemented:

D128En, bit [17]
When FEAT_D128 is implemented:

PTTWI, bit [16]
When FEAT_THE is implemented:

SCTLR2En, bit [15]
When FEAT_SCTLR2 is implemented:

TCR2En, bit [14]
When FEAT_TCR2 is implemented:

MSCEn, bit [11]
When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

MCE2, bit [10]
When FEAT_MOPS is implemented:

CMOW, bit [9]
When FEAT_CMOW is implemented:

VFNMI, bit [8]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

VINMI, bit [7]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

TALLINT, bit [6]
When FEAT_NMI is implemented:

SMPME, bit [5]
When FEAT_SME is implemented:

FGTnXS, bit [4]
When FEAT_XS is implemented:

FnXS, bit [3]
When FEAT_XS is implemented:

EnASR, bit [2]
When FEAT_LS64_V is implemented:

EnALS, bit [1]
When FEAT_LS64 is implemented:

EnAS0, bit [0]
When FEAT_LS64_ACCDATA is implemented: